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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
ESTHER 0. KELLOGG, 
YS. 
Plaintiff and 
A ppellwnt, 
C ~\ L I F 0 R N I A W E S T E R N 
S T A T E S LIFE INSURANCE 
CO:\IP A~'Y, 
Defenda.nt a.nd · 
Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7159 
On June 24, 1943, the respondent insurance company 
issued a life insurance policy to Neal Kellogg, which con-
tained a provision for double indemnity in the event of 
accidental death within the terms of the contract. Mr. 
Kellogg was operated in August, 1944, for rupture duo-
denal ulcer and an impacted diseased appendix. He was 
operated on October 12, 1945, for a ventral hernia 
through the. site of the old incision, and the removal of 
many adhesions between the bowel and the peritoneum. 
He died October 13, 1945, from surgical shock. He was on 
the operating table six hours. The insurance company has 
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paid th~ face of the policy, but asserts if is not obligated 
to pay the double inden1nity. It defends on the ground 
that the death was not effected wholly by accidental 
means, but resulted directly or indirectly from physical 
infirmity or irlness or disease. 
The trial court found in favor of the defendant: 
"6. That on October 12, 1945 a surgical operation 
was performed on the deceased, Neal J. Kellogg, at his 
request, at Missoula, Montana, by Dr. W. Neil1\fcPhail, 
and that on and prior to August 17, 1944, Neal J. Kellogg 
was suffering from a stomach ulcer which ruptured on 
said date, allowing a portion of the contents of his 
stomach to escape into the peritoneal cavity, and that 
on August 17, 1944, a surgical operation was performed 
on Neal J. KeUogg at Missoula, Montana, by Dr. vV. 
Neil McPhail, and that in said operation said ruptured 
ulcer was repaired and the appendix of Neal J. Kellogg 
was found to be impacted and diseased and it was re-
moved by said surgeon with apparent normal results, 
but thereafter, and as a result of the ruptured ulcer 
and the operation perforri1ed by said surgeon to repair 
said ruptured ulcer, the said Neal J. Kellogg developed a 
postoperative hernia in the location of the incision for 
the operation performed in 1944, and the said Neal J. 
Kellogg developed and became afflicted with numerous 
adhesions between his intestines and other tissues in his 
abdomen, including the lining of the peritoneal cavity. 
"7. That •the operation of October 12, 1945, was per-
formed by Dr. McPhail for the purpose of re'lieving the 
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pain and discon1fort which the said Neal J. Kellogg 
was suffering by reason of the postoperative hernia 
into the site of the first incision, having been examined 
cmnpletely prior therto and to the examining physician 
he appeared to be physically fit for such operation, and 
when said doctor had opened up the peritoneal cavity, 
he found that the said Neal J. Kellog had said adhesions 
in his abdon1en and that said adhesions constituted a 
~erious threat to the life of said Neal J. K·ellogg if not 
repaired, and the said Dr. ~fcPhaii thereupon, in the 
exercise of his skill as a surgeon, undertook to repair 
and remove said adhesions. 
'' 8. That the repair of said hernia and adhesions on 
October 12, 1945 consumed approximately six hours, and 
as a result of the operation which had been made neces. 
sary by the prior rupturedulcer and prior surgery, said 
~ eal J. Kellogg went into surgical shock anq died on 
October 13, 1945, and that no accident or mishap occurred 
at or during said surgery. His condition appeared to be 
good immediately following the operation. 
"9. That the death of said Neal J. Kellogg did not 
occur as the result of bodily injury effected exclusiveiy 
and wholly by external vidlent and accidental means. 
"10. That the death of the said Neal J. Kellogg re. 
suited directly or indirectly from physical infirmity or 
illness or disease, to-wit : The ruptured ulcer of the sto-
mach caused and made necessary the surgery in 1944 
upon the body of the said Neal J. Kellogg, and said sur-
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gery caused and made necessary the surgery of 194~, 
which in turn caused the death of said Neal J. Kellogg." 
The testimony in the record consists of the dep-
osition of Dr. W. Neil l\fcPhail of Missoula, Montana, 
who performed both operations, and Dr. Clark Young of 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Dr. McPhail testified that Kellogg had an ulcer of 
the stomach which ruptured while Kellogg was in 
Missoula in August, 1944. He operated on August 17, 
1944, and found an impacted, diseased appendix which 
was also removed. 
The contents of the stomach had partiaHy emptied 
into the peritoneal cavity and set up a general inflamma-
tion or peritonitis. The rupture of the ulcer and resulting 
surgery caused numerous adhesions between the intes-
tines and the peritoneal lining. 'The rupture of the ulcer 
and the surgery which was necessary in order to save 
Kellogg's life caused the adhesions·of the intestines and 
the ventral hernia. The hernia made Kellogg constantly 
uncomfortable and he was many times in pain from it. 
( Tr. 22) If he did not have the second operation, he 
would have to suffer the rest of his life, stay in bed, or 
certainly not in an upright position at any time, and his 
condition would preclude almost any a~tivity for 
him. His life expectancy was extremely short - sitting 
on a volcano the whole time. The bowel obstructions were 
more serious and hazardous because of the ventral 
hernia. The bowel at several points was practically 
completely obstructed. The movement of the matter 
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through the bowel was impaired. The bowel might at any 
time becmne con1pletely obstructed. The operation could 
not be delayed for long. In a short time there would have 
been an obstruction. 
The second operation for the relief of the ventral 
hernia and the adhesions was performed on the 12th of 
October, El-!5. Kellogg died on October 13, from post-
operative shock. He was given sodium pentothal anes-
thesia together with some nitrous oxide or oxygen. He 
was on the operating table from 11 :00 a.1n. until 5 :00 
o'clock p.m. One of the causes of death was the time con-
sunled in repairing the extensive adhesions of Kellogg's 
intestines. (Tr. 27) 
An inrmedia te cause of death was ventricular fib-
ri'llation. That means the large heart muscle does not 
contract - it just quivers. It is a worn out heart. (Tr.29) 
The perforated duodenal ulcer was one of the contrib ... 
utory causes of death. Another contributory cause was 
the extensive and prolonged surgery made necessary by 
the adhesions of the bowel. (Tr. 30) When Mr. Kellogg 
went into surgical shock about 1:00 a.m. October 13, 
1945, he was given heart stimulant, blood plasma, and 
glucose in saline. He died at 1:00 p.m. He was 45 years 
old. 
There was nothing about the operation which was 
unusua~ or out of the ordinary. His condition was good 
immediately following the operation. 
Dr. Young's testimony is briefly summarized as 
follows: 
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The doctor who operates expects a favorable result. 
(Tr. 7) A six hour operation would certainly suggest the 
fact that the patient might have a surgical shock. Six 
hours is a very unusual time to be on the operating table. 
(Tr. 9) Not being there I don't know whether a trans-
fusion was indicated or not. Each case is different. 
Otherwise it seemed that he used most every method that 
he could. (To keep the patient alive) Post operative 
shock resUlts from severe trauma on the sympathetic 
nervous system, a,ilso loss of blood and bodily fluids. (Tr. 
10 and 11) Ventricular fibrillation is the final spasm of 
the heart muscle. The heart has to stop some way. Fail-
ure to give blood plasma may have been the right thing 
to do. Ideas of what is proper in connection with surgery 
change continually. Embolus is found ordinarily in a 
week or ten c}ays after surgery. We now get them up 
early to avoid clots. Except in extreme cases, the patient 
is not expected to die from the surgery. The surgeon 
does what he can to prepare the patient for surgery to 
prevent shock. (Tr. 18) Usually he does not operate un-
til he overcomes shock from prior accident. The opera-
tion on the ulcer produced the hernia and adhesions. The 
initial link in the chain of cause and effect was the repair 
of this ulcer. If a r"\}ptured ulcer is not operated, the per-
son will die. The ruptured ulcer made the first operation 
necessary. The first surgery caused the ventral hernia, 
which made the second operation necessary. (Tr. 21) 
The second operation caused death. (Tr. 22) Death from 
such surgery is something that frequently occurs. Every-
thing c:ombined makes a bad prognosis. ( Tr. 27) 
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There was nothing unusual in the surgery itself. 
There was no en1bolism, which is a clot of b~ood lodging 
in the body and producing death. There was no slip of 
the knife or any failure on the part of the surgeon to 
exercise ordinary care in the service furnished the· 
patient. 
ARGU~IENT 
·Appellant argues the case as if the appeal here in-
volved were a new trial on the facts before this Court. 
'Vhile there was no substantial conflict in the testimony 
below, the Trial Court in making findings, conclusions 
and judgment, was drawing ultimate facts and conclu-
:-;ions from the evidence. 
''This being a law case, we do not determine 
whether as a fact plaintiff was negligent, but only 
whether or not the evidence sustains the finding 
of the trial court to that effect.'' Erca;nbrack vs. 
Ellison, et al, 103 U. 138, 34 P. 2d. 177. 
The consideration of this case should begin with the 
policy. It provides double indemnity if death occurred 
as the result of bodily injury effected exclusively and 
wholly by external, violent and accidental means, and that 
such death occurred within 90 days after sustaining such 
InJury. 
The ''risks not covered'' provide the benefit shall 
not be payable if the death results directly or indirectly 
from physical infi.rmity, from illness or disease of any 
kind. 
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The 1nost recent Utah case invo1ving accidental 
death is Tucker vs. New York Life Insurance Oompany, 
155 P. 2d. 173, 107 Utah 478. The deceased, Garber 1\L 
Nichols, fell on the sidewa1k on November 19, 1941, and 
broke his arm. He had been a patient of Dr. Ralph T. 
Richards from early in November, 1940. He died Decenl-
ber 7, 1941, from a ruptured dissecting aneurysm of the 
aorta. The circulatory disease had been present in l\fr. 
Nichols for a year or more. This condition or disease was 
active and progressive. The doctors expressed the belief · 
that the intima of the aorta gave way and caused death, 
and this was the result of the diseased condition which 
had so weakened this artery ·that it could not stand the in-
creased blood pressure occasioned by the fall or the 
strain imposed upon the aorta after the injury. The Su-
preme Court held the death was caused by an existing 
disease which cooperated with the accident in causing 
death and therefore the trial court shou'ld have directed 
the verdict for defendant. In the Kellogg case the ulcer of 
the stomach is a disease or bodily infirmity which caused 
the death. 
The Utah Court in Bnownilng vs. Equit.able Life 
Insurance C01npany, 94 U. 532, 72 P 2d 1060, said the 
courts, in interpreting the clause, an injury through 
accidental means independent of all other causes have 
made three classes of cases: (1) When an accident causes 
a diseased condition which together with the accident 
results in the injury or death, the accident alone is con-
sidered. as the cause. (2) When at the time of the acci-
dent, the insured was suffering from some disease, but 
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the disease had no causal connection with the injury or 
death resulting from the accident, the accident is to/ be 
eonsidered the sole cause. (3) When at the time of the 
accident there was an existing disease which, cooperotimg 
with the accident, resulted in the injury or death, the 
accident cannot be considered as the sole eause or as the 
eause independent of all other causes. (citing cases under 
each category) The Tucker case followed the rule of the 
Browning case. 
One of the cases cited by the Utah Court is Smith vs. 
Federal Insurance Cormpari!!J, 6 F. 2d 283, Smith assisted 
in getting a car out of the mud and died the same evening 
from acute n1yocarditis. The proof of death said "caused 
by strain in lifting - contributory cause influenza several 
weeks ago. '' The doctors expressed the opinion that 
probably the influenza had weakened the heart, and that 
the pushing of the automobile was a strain too great for 
the weakened organ. 
The court said: 
''Where the insured, at the time he receives 
the injury is suffering from a diseas·e, or defect, 
which, acting with the injury, as a contributing 
factor brings about the death, or when such ex-
isting disease or defect aggravates the effect of 
the injury or the injury aggravates the effect of 
the disease, and both acting together, cause the 
death, the injury is not the sole cause of the 
death." (citing cases) 
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In the Tucker case the deceased (Nichols) had been 
suffering from high blood pressure for at least a year 
prior to his accidental fall. "He had been suffering 
from a known disease for a period of a year or longer. 
The condition of the disease was not on1y active but pro-
gressive.'' 
In Rapp vs. Mietropolitam Accident & Health Ins. Co. 
8 N. W. 2d 692, (Nebraska 1943) the insured died of 
surgical shock induced by an operation for an obstruc-
tion of the bile duct. Attempts were made to drain the 
gall bladder n1echa!lically without success. He was taking 
medicine including synkamin and 5% glucose. He was 
itching and getting worse. \Vith a complete obstruction 
the patient would eventually die. On April 30, ·he was 
operated for exp1lora:tion. _'That morning his pulse and 
respiration were normal and in the doctor's opinion he 
would have withstood an operation. The duration of such 
an oper'ation is from one hour to an hour and a half. 
After the operation had been in progress about 37 min-
utes, the patient went into shock and died in about 30 
minutes. An autopsy was performed. 
"If one dies unexpectedly during a major 
surgical operation, where there is no mishap, slip 
or any unexpected, unusual or unforeseen occur-
rence, his death is not the result of accidenta·l 
m·eans. In the instant case there was no accident 
during the insured's exploratory major surgical 
operation. 'True, no one expected insured to die 
on the operating table, but an accidental death 
does not depend upon what one expects will or 
will not happen. Every one knows that there 1s 
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much uncertainty about what will or will not hap-
pen during a major surgical operation, if the pa-
tient is in a poor physical condition and if the 
purpose of the operation is to explore in order to 
prolong the life of the insured, who in this case 
couid have died, as testified to by his attending 
physician, on the afternoon of the day of the 
operation, if surgical steps had not been taken in 
an effort to prolong his life.'' 
"From the doctor's contact with the patient, 
the treatment administered, the patient's reac-
tions, the doctor's observations, the history found 
by the doctor in the operation, and on the autopsy 
which the doctor attended, it was his opinion that 
the poor physical condition of the patient ·exist-
ing in the period of time through which he at~ 
tended him, co;used the surgical shock suffered 
by the patient. This was due to severe damage to 
the cells of the liver and its inability to detoxica:te 
or break down the poisonous substances which are 
put into it, thus lessening the resistance of all 
the tissues, so the patient could not react as read-
ily as he could have done at some previous period; 
that is, it was the patient's general condition and 
the condition of his tissues which caused his fail-
ure to respond to the stimulant. The patient did 
not have sufficient strength or stamina to with-
stand the operation; it oaused the shock; it was 
not am ,accident." 
The Kellogg case is ruled by the Tucker case which 
holds the accident was not the sole cause, but was as-
sisted by a cooperating aneurysm, which is a disease or 
bodily infirmity. There was no controversy about the 
deceased sustaining an accident in the Tucker case. He 
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fell and broke his leg. There was testimony this caused 
the rupture of a weakened inner lining of the artery. But 
th,e court held that because a pre-existing disease of the 
artery had weakened it and thus cooperated as a cause 
of death, there should be no recovery. In the Kel'logg 
case the testimony is undisputed that the ruptured ulcer 
was the first link in an unbroken chain of cause and 
effect which finally produced death. (The ruptured 
ulcer; the first operation; the post-operative hernia; and 
adhesions of the bowel; ~the, second operation ; the death.) 
Both the ruptured ulcer· and the adhesions and the 
hernia cons~itute an infirmity or dis·ease which were 
one of the efficient operating causes of death and thus 
preclude recovery. 
In W.eU.e vs. M etropolit,an Li-fe Insurance Oampany, 
27 N.E. 2d 63, (Illinois 1940) the deceased had an ulcer of 
the duodenum. He accidently slipped and fe'll thus caus-
ing a rupture of the ulcer. He had to undergo an oper-
ation for the ruptured ulcer and as a result of the oper-
ation he developed bronchial pneumonia from which he 
died. The policy was substantially th~ same as the one 
here involved. The court held the defendent was not 
liable. 
''The authorities cited by the app~llee are 
distinguishable on an' important basis of fact from 
the case at bar. The complaint in the present 
case shows that the accidental injury was to a 
diS'eased growth, which is an object foreign to 
the normal body, namely, a duodenal ulcer. 'The 
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co1nplaint alleges that the slipping and falling 
of the insured acted upon this ulcer, causing it 
to rupture and bring about the necessity· of an 
operation, which caused his death. Had there been 
no ulcer. there would have been no injury, as an 
ulcer i~ not a part of a normal person's anatomy. 
It is a disease or bodi·ly infirmity which develops 
and gro"-s in son1e individuals, and is of itself, a 
disease or bodily infirmity. !As was said in the 
:Masonic Association vs. Shryock, supra, and 
quoted with approval by us in Crandall v. Casual-
ty Con1pany, supra, if at the time he sustained the 
accident ·he was suffering from a pre-existing 
disease or bodily infirmity, and the accident woUld 
not have caused his death if he had not been af-
fected with the disease or infirmity, but he died 
because the accident aggravated the effects of 
the disease, or the disease aggravated the effects 
of the accident, the contract was that the insur-
ance company, should not be liable for the amount 
of his insurance. '' 
An ulcer is a disease or boaily infirmity. When it 
ruptures as Kellogg's did surgery is imperat~ve to save 
the patient's life. Certainly, this ruptured ulcer was the 
principal factor in Kellogg's death. It ·was a direct cause 
of death. The parties contracted that if death results 
directly or indirectly from physical infirmity or disease 
of any kind the accidental benefits should not be payable. 
The plaintiff has been paid all the benefits to which she 
is entitled. 
In Mu.tual Life lnsura;nce Co,. vs. Hassi:ng, 134 F. 2d 
717 (C. C. A. 10th-1943), the facts and rule are shown 
by the following quotation: 
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''Here the evidence shows that the insured 
approached the moving train. He stood on the 
curb momentarily, turned and walked to the cen-
ter of the street alongside the moving train where 
he stopped and faced the train. While thus stand-
ing with both hands in his topcoat pockets, he 
went down on one knee and under the moving 
train-death resulted. Here the evidence stops, 
and from that point the jury was required to 
speculate on the cause of the fail. There is no 
evidence or reasonable inferences from which 
it can be said that the insured tripped, slipped, 
was pushed, shoved, or otherwise impeHed under 
the moving train. There is, we think, a reasonable 
inference to be drawn from the evidence that the 
insured's peculiar disease caused him to lose his 
equilibrium and become overbalanced, as a re-
sult of which he fell headlong under the moving 
train. Indeed, the facts seem to repel any other 
reasonable inference. But it is not essential to a 
verdict for the defendant that the evidence should 
repei any other hypothesis than the one advanced 
by it. It is incumbent upon plaintiff to take the 
cas-e from without the realm of speculation, con-
jecture, and surmise, and to create a faetual basis 
from which a reasonable inference can be drawn. 
Failing in this, plaintiff cannot prevail. New 
York ·Life Insurance Company v. Doerksen, 
supra. 
''In our opinion, the ·evidence fails to meet 
that degree of proof which we hold is essential 
to establish with any degree of certainty or prob-
ability that death was effected by accidental 
n1eans, solely and exclusively of an other causes. 
''The judgment is reversed.'' 
The Hassing cas·e arose in Utah and the court had 
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quoted with approval the rule of the Utah case of Brown-
ing rs. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 94 Utah 570, 
80 P. 2d, 348: 
'• ~ ~ ~ 'If the accident or injury resulting in 
the disability or loss was produced, caused, set 
in Inotion or operation by disease or infirmity, 
then it is indirectly caus·ed by such disease or in-
fi.nnity ~ ~ ~ and not of accident.' " 
The appellant relies upon the Handly case, Rwndly 
'l'S. J!utual L·ife Insurance Company of N1ew York, 147 P. 
2d 319. The lin1itation upon the rule in the Handly case 
is shown b:~ the following portion of this decision. After 
posing the question of whether "any and every unex-
pected resu1t of a technically correct op~ration is not an 
accident" the court said: ' 
''Perhaps so, but we need now go no further 
than to say that where it clearly appears from the 
evidence that the operation set in motion diefinit.e 
particles of matter distmctly and directly trace-
able to the operation without which the, proba-
bility is that they would not have been g1evnerate•d 
or set in motion and it specifioall;y appears that 
the action of that substomce on ·a vital orgam 
caused the death of the patient, such death was 
directly caused by an injury effected by violent, 
external and accidental means.'' 
If we test the facts in the Kellogg case by the limita-
tion of the law in the Handley case, it is clear that the 
rule of that case does not apply here. Kellogg did not 
have any blood clot. His operation did not set in motion 
definite particles .of ma.Uer which caused death. The 
court in the Handley case refused to hold that any and 
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every unexpected result of a technically correct opera-
tion is an accident: 
It is interesting to point out that the death in the 
Kellogg case was not entirely unexpected after the long 
operation made necessary by the extensive adhesions. 
Surely no court would hold that every death following 
surgery is accidental unless the doctor who operated 
is willing to testify that he expected the patient would 
die as the result of surgery, and he had 'this expectation 
when he began the operation. The on'ly expectation which 
should be c'onsidered is that following the surgery Dr. 
~fcPhail and Dr. Young recognized that the prognosis 
for Kellogg was not very good after surgery. It is hard 
to. believe that a workable rule can be established which 
is based on nothing more substantial than the optimism 
or pessimism of the surgeon. 
One reaon why the Handley case is not in point is 
because of the difference between surgical shock and 
pulmonary embolism. Post operative shock results from 
severe trauma on the sympathetic nervous system, a~so 
loss of blood and bodily fluids. The wear and tear on the 
system caused by surgery if too much for the resistance 
and vitality of the patient will always produce surgical 
shock. It is not something to which some patients have a 
peculiar susceptibility like certain anesthesia as in the 
"\Vhatcott case. True it is that som·e persons can stand 
more pain or surgery than others without going into 
shock, but that does not mean that a shock death follow-
ing surgery is unexpected in the sense that a hyper-
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susceptibility to novocain is unexpected. This court 
pointed out the reason why the pulmonary embolus in 
the Handley case was an accident. The Ke'llogg death 
falls outside the reason of the Handley case. The part-
icles of matter set in motion by the operation in the 
Handley case which caused death are absent in the Kel-
logg case. 
Another reason for distinction between the 'cases is 
the difference between the hernia from which Handley 
was suffering and the condition of Kellogg when the 
operation was performed from which he died. There was 
no evidence in the Handley case that the hernia was a 
cooperating cause of death. It is not sufficient to say 
that the hernia was the cause of the operation. If Hand-
ley had suffered a pulmonary embolus from so_me minor 
surgery for the removal of a wart or cyst, the embolus 
would have been the so~e cause of death. 
But Kellogg did not suffer any unexpected result-
from the surgery except the death itself. He had no em-
bolism. The ruptured ulcer and the extensive ab~ominal 
adhesions which it produced, following the first opera-
tion, was a cooperating cause of death. Dr. McPhail 
found such a mass of adhesions that the bowels were· al-
most comp~etely obstructed in a place or two, and the 
repair of the ventral hernia together with the removal 
and repair of the adhesions took six hours. ''A six hour 
operation would certainly suggest the fact that the 
patient might have a surgical shock.'' The death followed 
as the natural result of the extensive surgery made 
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necessary by the adhesions and the ventral hernia, which 
had been brought on by the ruptured ulcer. The resist-
ance and vitality of the patient was unable to pull him 
through the extensive surgery made necessary by his ex-
tensive infirmities. It is impossible to picture the cause 
of the death of Kellogg without including the extensive 
adhesions, which had to be removed by surgery. It is 
probable Handley's hernia had no relation to the death 
other than the fact it made surgery advisable. 
In n1aking this comparison we are not arguing that 
there is a distinction between the case at bar and the 
Handley case, because Handley had sustained an acci-
dental hernia more than 90 days before death. We con-
cede that an operative incision may constitute ''external, 
violent and accidental means" depending on what the 
result of the operation may be. If it results in a pul-
monary embolus, it is accidental. Under the Handley 
case, the means and the result are to be viewed as one 
package. Appellant is asking the court to extend the 
rule of pulmonary embolus to surgical shock from six 
hours, of surgery to remove adhesions. No case has gone 
that far. The Nebraska Court refused to hold death from 
surgical shock accidental in the Rapp case. (supra) The 
Appellate Court of Illinios in Ebbert vs. M etropoUtan 
Lifie lnsur~anc;e Comparuy, 7 N. E. 2d. 336, held that death 
during surgery for the removal of tonsils was not acci-
dentat It appeared the insured was suffering from dis-
ease which contributed to his dea:th. 
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The Handley case was decided on March 13, 1944. On 
July 13, 19+±, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals de-
cided Preferred Acc·iden.t Tnsura.nce Co. rs Clark, 144 F. 
:2d, 165. It is interesting to compare the two cases. The 
Federal Court applied the New York rule, because it 
was stipulated a New York contract was involved. The 
dec.eased was operated on April 25, 1941, for the re-
moval of the gall bladder and appendix and the drainage 
of the co1nn1on bile duct. Following the operation, he 
suffered an acute n1assive pu'lmonary collapse and died 
24 hours after the operation. New York like Utah does 
not recognize the distinction between ipsurance against 
loss fron1 accidental means and loss from accidental re-
sult. The New York test is whether the average man, 
under the existing facts and circumstances, would re-
gard the loss so unforeseen, unexpected, and extra-
ordinary that he would say it was an accident. The ap-
plication of the rule seems to closely parallel the Utah 
cases. (Sunstroke, infection from puncture of a pimple, 
administration of morphine and atropine) However, 
New York, has refused to foHow the rule announced to · 
a death by pulmonary embolism. (See Bennett vs. Equit-
able Life Assurance Society, 13 N.Y. S. 2d 540) The 
New York Court said: 
''Here, however, the death ensued as the 
result of post operative pulmonary emboli~m. 
In such event, the co1use was neither trivial nor the 
result unforeseen.'' 
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The Tenth Circuit held the death from pulmonary 
collapse following surgery by twenty-four hours was not 
accidental: 
''Excluding those cases where the condition 
of the patient is desperate and an operation is 
resorted to with the hope of possibly saving his 
life, we know that death does not ordinarily re-
sult from a major abdominal operation. Yet we 
also know that death does result from complica-
tions arising after major abdominal operations 
in a limited number of eases, and that, while the 
patient does not expect death, he knows it is a 
possible eventuality. For example, one who sub-
mits to a simple appendectomy, where the con-
dition is not acu:te, knows that he may be one of 
a comparatively small number who will die as a 
result of the operation. He does not expect death,-
but he knows it may occur. In such cases, we do 
nol think an ordinary man would say that the 
death was accidental. Here, the insured was suf-
fering from a chronic gall. bladder ailment. In 
addition to that, his appendix was seriously in-
volved. He was also suffering from parenchy-
matous degeneration of the liver and kidneys. 
He was 62 years of age. We do not think that 
the ordinary man, under the attending facts and 
circumstances, where a major operation in the 
upper abdominal cavity caus·ed a pulmonary col-
laps·e resulting in death, would regard the death 
as accidental." 
The reasoning of this case supports our contention 
that the rule of the Handley case does not apply and 
should not be extended to the facts and circumstances 
of the Kellogg case. The surgery to which KeUogg sub-
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1nitted was not trival and the result was not unforseen. 
The death of Kellogg resulted directly or indirectly from 
physical infirmity or from illness or dis!ease. The de-
cision of the Trial Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submvttt.ed, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Atto1'neys for Respondent 
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